Measuring the restrictiveness of trade policy in a way that allows international and intertemporal comparability is important for trade negotiations and other comparative policy evaluation purposes. In the absence of a theory of index numbers for trade restrictions, analysts have used ad hoc indexes of restrictiveness such as the trade-weighted average tariff and the coefficient of variation of tariffs, despite their apparent flaws. For quota restrictions, the trade-weighted average tariff equivalent of the quota is standard. In Hamilton and Kim (1990), for example, this measure is used along with five others in an attempt to evaluate the restrictiveness of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA).
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THE WVORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL 8, NO 2 the MFA from 1982 to 1989. The MFA controls the shipment of most textile and apparel items to the United States through a system of bilaterally negotiated export quotas, or voluntary export restraints (VERS) . There is an allowance for annual growth in the quotas, and the arrangement itself was renegotiated in 1986 (MFA-III was replaced by MFA-IV) , with an expansion in the number of items covered and countries included. In addition to these policy changes, economic conditions changed over the data period in both the United States and the exporting countries, as well as the rest of the world. All these influences altered the restricitiveness of the MFA. The TRI in principle permits all these influences to be accounted for in a consistent manner.
The trade restrictiveness of a VER may be viewed from either the importer's or the exporter's point of view, and both are considered here. In each MFA product category, we assume that all exporters produce perfect substitutes. Nevertheless, each exporter nation has monopoly power because of the restrictions on other suppliers to the VER-constrained market. Specifically, a license to sell an additional unit adds to total rent by the amount of the quota premium but depresses the premium and causes a loss on inframarginal quota licenses. Hong Kong is the main exporter of textile and apparel products to the United States, and for a low assumed elasticity of U.S. demand, it has sufficient market power in trade with the United States that a marginal fall in trade restrictiveness helps the United States while hurting Hong Kong.' This is related to the finding of Trela and Whalley (1990) that a reversion to free trade would hurt Hong Kong. For higher elasticities of U.S. demand, Hong Kong's monopoly power is less, and a fall in trade restrictiveness helps both nations. This issue does not arise for the remaining exporters, which have market shares too small to create a large inverse elasticity, but in all cases the measure of trade restrictiveness is quantitatively altered when the point of view shifts from exporter to importer because the weights in the index are altered.
Section I reviews the theory of the TRI and outlines how changes in it are calculated from the perspective of importing and exporting countries. Section II discusses the data used. Section III presents and evaluates the results, and section IV offers conclusions. The appendix details the calculation of the shadow prices of quotas, the key step in operationalizing changes in the TRI.
I. THE THEORY OF THE TRI
If a single quota changes, an unambiguous measure of the change in trade restrictiveness is, trivially, the change in the quota. An alternative measure is the change in the domestic price of the quota-constrained good, equal to the change in the quota premium (the "tariff equivalent") if the foreign price is constant. The index number problem arises when many quotas shift simultaneously. The standard, atheoretic response to the problem is to use the trade-weighted average of the changes in tariff equivalents. 2 A key problem with the tariff equivalent approach is that quota rent is internationally shared, so that the quota premium does not generally represent a marginal welfare gain to either importer or exporter (see Anderson and Neary 1992b for a recent treatment of the shadow price of quotas, applied here in the appendix; for other problems with the tariff equivalent approach, see Anderson 1988) . Even setting this point aside, the problem remains that there is no theoretical basis for aggregating tariffs with a trade-weighted average. A standard complaint is that the trade weight is affected by the distortion, most dramatically when a zero quota receives a zero weight, whereas it appears that a zero quota should get a large weight.
In the case of a uniform proportional shift in all quotas, the problem collapses back to the trivial case because in effect there is only one quota. The theoretical index number solution given by Anderson and Neary (1990) builds on this insight to define the TRI as the uniform scaling factor that, applied to the new set of quotas, yields the same level of welfare as that obtained with the initial set of quotas. Defined in this way, the scaling factor rises when all quotas fall (tighten), signifying a rise in restrictiveness. The novelty of the TRI is that it uses appropriate weights for forming a weighted sum of the quota changes. Each quota change receives a weight equal to the marginal welfare contribution of a 1 percent-rise in the quota relative to the marginal welfare contribution of a 1 percent rise in all quotas. The weights work out to be the trade shares evaluated in terms of the shadow prices. Because these weights are grounded in welfare theory, they are preferred to atheoretic weights such as trade shares.
We implement the TRI in an economy that abstracts from many complications. The economy is assumed to be competitive and to face no distortions other than those arising from the trade policy. A representative agent consumes and produces unconstrained tradable goods at domestic price ir and purchases or sells the goods at international prices rx '; with the difference, 7r -7r*, made up by tariffs. The representative agent also consumes and produces quota-constrained goods, for which the importer's price is p, the exporter's price is p', and the quota itself is q. (All these variables are vectors; elements of them will be denoted by a subscript.) Within a given product category all exporters' products are perfect substitutes. Each VER-constrained exporter's supply price is assumed to be constant. 3 In contrast, the importer's price is endogenous. We radically simplify the true complexity of the pricing of quota-constrained goods in order to focus on the difference our methods make to quota evaluation even in a simple model. Thus we assume that trade is executed once a year and that all quotas bind. The latter extreme assumption is partially defensible by appealing to the value of quota licenses as options (Anderson 1987) , resulting in protection even when the quota appears not to bind. Moreover, many utilization rates for MFA quotas exceed 90 percent (Hamilton 1988) .
Welfare Foundations
To define the TRI, we must first characterize the equilibrium of the economy. We do this in terms of the balance-of-trade function, which equals the economy's total net expenditure on traded goods less the revenue from trade restrictions, all of which is assumed to be returned in a lump sum to the representative consumer. (Further details on the properties of the balance-of-trade function may be found in Anderson and Neary 1992b.) For the importing country, the balanceof-trade function is
(Here and in the remainder of the article, subscripts other than i,j, and k denote partial derivatives.) The left-hand side of equation 1 states that the balance of trade depends on the home prices of unconstrained goods, T; the permitted import levels of quota-constrained goods, q; the utility of the representative consumer, u; and the world prices of both sets of goods, Tr and p*. Besides these active arguments, the balance-of-trade function depends on variables such as technology and factor endowments, which are inactive here and are hence suppressecl. The first term on the right-hand side of equation 1 is equal to the "distorted" trade expenditure function, giving the net expenditure on the unconstrained goods. (Expenditure on the unconstrained goods is distorted by the presence of binding quotas.) The second term equals the total expenditure on the quota-constrained goods because -Eq equals p, the vector of the prices of these good[s in the importing country. The third term equals tariff revenue from unconstrained goods because E,, equals net imports of those goods. The fourth and final term is the importing country's portion of the rents generated by the quota constraints, to which we return below. For the typical exporting country, the balance-of-trade function is (2) B# (T2, q, u*; T, 
The description of the individual terms in equation 2 is identical to that of the corresponding terms in equation 1, with R* denoting the exporting country's portion of the quota rents. The assumption that p* is constant means that -E*q is constant in equation 2. The exporting country is assumed to be a price taker for its imports of non-MFA products, so Tr is a constant. In practice, T denotes a vector of prices for a different set of non-quota-constrained goods from those in the importing country, so that E7r and E refer to different sets of goods. Turning next to the division of quota rents, we assume that rents accrue to the exporting country except for that portion retained by the importing country by imposing on the quota-constrained goods a vector of ad valorem tariffs, r. (Actual U.S. tariffs on MFA imports average about 20 percent.) The usual prac-tice is to levy the tariff on a base value equal to the exporter's price, p*, plus the market price of a unit export license, p. 4 Arbitrage implies that for each good i, 
The Trade Restrictiveness Index
The trade restrictiveness index is defined as follows. Starting with the new setting of the quota policy ql, scale the quotas by a uniform expansion or contraction factor so that with utility at the old level, the balance of trade is unchanged and equilibrium prevails. In effect, the TRI gives the uniforrn quota contraction equivalent of the actual policy change. A rise in the index implies a rise in trade restrictiveness and a tightening of quotas. 5 Formally, the TRI iS defined from the importer's point of view as (5) A (r, ql, u 0 
The simplest interpretation arises when the new quota vector ql rises to the freetrade level. The TRI is then less than one and is the uniform quantity contraction factor that destroys as much utility (lowers utility to the initial distorted-level u°) as the initial quota vector q 0 . That is, the initial quota policy q 0 is equivalent in restrictiveness to a uniform reduction in free-trade quantities by the factor A. For other values of ql, A is the uniform contraction factor that is equivalent to the change in restrictiveness implied in the move to ql. If policy becomes more restrictive, A is greater than one. In principle, it is of course possible to always measure policy in relation to the free trade benchmark, but in practice, the freetrade quantities are calculated with considerable error.
4. This is true for the ma)ority of cases in which the importng agent contracts with an exporter who already owns a license-the invoice price (which is the dutiable base) includes the value of the license. For the minority of cases in which the exporter must first purchase a license, the dutiable base in U.S. trade case law excludes the license price. Because the exporter avoids taxes in the latter case, it should be the dominanr form: all exporters should buy and sell their licenses in the market as needed. The reason that is not done is that exporters lose future rights to receive licenses if they transfer them beyond a small allowance. The behavior of exporters suggests that the value of this penalty is large. In any case, our results are not sensitive to whether the dutiable base excludes or includes the value of the license.
5. In our earlier work (Anderson and Neary 1990; Anderson 1991) , the index was called the coefficient of trade utlization (in recognition of its link to Debreu's coefficient of resource utilization), and the sign convention was reversed: a rise in the index denoted a fall in restrictiveness.
6. This definition of A is "partial" because it is for quotas only. See Anderson and Neary (1992a) for a definition of the TRI that includes variations in tariffs as well as quotas. The equilibrium value of B is assumed to be zero here, but it could be any constant value 176 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL 8, NO 2 An intuitive understanding of the TRI is helped by considering its rate-ofchange form. The rate-of-change form is also easier to implement and is the one we apply in later sections. Differentiating equation 5 and using to denote percentage change,
Here, -B, which is minus the derivative of the balance-of-trade function with respect to the quota on good i, is the shadow price of the quota on good i. Thus the rate of change of the TRI is equal to minus the weighted sum of the changes in individual quotas. If all weights are positive (which need not be the case), equation 6 is a weighted average. The structure of the weights is intuitive. The denominator is the marginal social value (the foreign exchange savings) of a 1 percent expansion of all the quotas. The numerator is the marginal social value (the foreign exchange savings) of a 1 percent rise in the quota on good i. Thus the weight is the marginal value of a 1 percent rise in quota i in relation to the marginal value of a 1 percent rise in all quotas. A rise in quota q, will cause a fall in the TRI (trade restrictiveness falls) when its weight is positive, as happens when the corresponding shadow price of the quota (-B,) is positive and the denominator is positive. For exporting countries the same operation as in equation 5 defines the TRI, except that the relevant balance-of-trade function is that of the exporting nation. Similarly, the same operation as in equation 6 defines the rate of change of the TRI for the exporting nation, except that the shadow prices of quotas are those for the exporting nation.
II. OPERATIONALIZING THE TRI
Equation 6 shows that the key step in operationalizing the TRI is to calculate the shadow prices of quotas. The details of how this is done in the present application are set out in the appendix, but two crucial simplifications should be noted. The first is the adoption of a partial equilibrium perspective. Because we are concerned with trade restrictions on a single industry only, it seems reasonable to ignore changes in the prices of nontraded goods or factors (prices of traded goods have already been held constant with the small-country assumption). The second simplifying assumption is that the importing country's expenditure function is separable with respect to the partition between MFA products and other goods and has a subexpenditure function for MFA products that has constant elasticity of substitution (CES) within the MFA group. This allows explicit calculation of the shadow prices with feasible data requirements.
The TRI is operationalized here with the formula in equation 6. This requires information on the elasticities and rates of change of constrained quantities. The substitution parameter of the CES form is inferred from an estimate of aggregate demand elasticity for textiles and apparel. The standard Divisia average is used to approximate the discrete change.
Two important issues arise in the evaluation of the MFA quota policy over time. First, the number of textiles and apparel products covered by VERS changes over time. Second, there is annual growth in quota allocations along with annual growth in the importing and exporting economies. As for the first issue, the balance-of-trade function that is the basis of equation 6 is viewed as having a very large list of quota arguments, many of which are set so high that the shadow price of the quota is equal to zero. (A nonbinding quota has no effect on the importer's price and hence no effect on any of the relevant variables.) Then, as the quota is tightened, the TRI rate-of-change formula picks it up with a nonzero shadow price (in numerator and denominator). Of course, the shadow price may jump discretely as the quota starts to bind, but this is qualitatively the same issue as a discrete change with quotas that already bind. The changing coverage phenomenon shows up in the present study in the inclusion of Bangladesh in MFA-IV, starting in 1986. (Lack of coverage in the license price data forces us to exclude some products newly subject to VER.) As for the issue of growth, it is obvious that an unchanging quota in a growing economy is becoming more restrictive. The solution to this problem offered by Anderson and Neary (1 992a) is to define the quota policy as the actual quota in relation to a quota that would leave the importer's price unchanged. In the special "neutral growth" case, the defined quota policy is equal to the actual growth rate of quotas minus the growth rate of real income. Thus, if the growth rate of quotas falls short of the growth rate of real income, quota policy has become more restrictive. In the results below, the rate of change of the TRI based on the actual policy changes is termed the uncompensated TRI rate of change, whereas the growthadjusted change (that is, equation 6 minus the rate of change of real income in the relevant country) is termed the compensated TRI rate of change.
The Data
The basic trade data for the study are the World Bank's data on shipments under t:he MFA. The free on board export value (p*q), quantity (q), and export unit value (p*) data for shipments from an exporter (denoted by EX) to the United States are extracted from the larger MFA data base. The seven exporters considered here are Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Thailand. The bilateral trade data are combined with license price data (p) from two sources: for Hong Kong, assembled from work done by Carl Hamilton; and for Indonesia, from data supplied to us by the Bursa authorities for two years relevant to the study.
Following Hamilton (1988) , a crude means of simulating license prices where they are missing is applied. By assuming perfect substitutability and perfect arbitrage, it can be inferred that the export supply price to the U.S. market must be the same for each good: (7) p-:EX + pEX = p*HK + pHK for any exporter EX where HK denotes Hong Kong. The right-hand side of equation 7 is data, so the license price pEX can be inferred if the variable psEX can be identified. Hamilton's method is to construct marginal costs of exporters on the basis of relative wage data adjusted for labor productivity and then to equate these marginal costs to p* because of the assumption of competition. For Taiwan (China), Hamilton (1988) reported that the implied estimates of p did not differ much from the limited license price information available. But in Krishna, Martin, and Tan (1992), Hamilton's method was checked against two years of Indonesian license price data and was found to give a large overestimate of the value of a license. One explanation of this divergence is that Hamilton's method of projecting costs is in error. 7 Fortunately, the TRi results are insensitive to across-the-board adjustments of the type implied by the productivity story, as noted below. A more problematic explanation for the divergence of the inferred from the direct license data is differences in quality, the implication being that the arbitrage assumption is not applicable. If differences in quality are important, it would mean that the results for exporters other than Hong Kong are suspect.
Commodities are aggregated within textiles and apparel to the 27 categories for which license price data for Hong Kong are available, and the years studied are similarly those for which complete license price data are available. Not all exporters ship in all categories, of course, and Bangladesh is subject to constraint only for 1986-88, that is, after MFA-IV. The TRI calculations also require the U.S. tariff rate on each category in each year of the study. In practice, 1986 data for the tariffs are used. As noted above, the quota policy is defined as the actual rate of change of shipments less the rate of growth of real disposable income. Because of uncertainty about the proper value of U.S. demand elasticity, we report results based on assumed U.S. substitution elasticities of 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0, vvith the unitary case apparently being the literature's consensus, following a suggestion of Trela and Whalley (1990) .
For comparison purposes, the trade-weighted average tariff equivalent of the quota is also calculated. The (ad valorem) tariff equivalent formula for year t is
The primary focus of this study is on annual rates of change in restrictiveness based on a Divisia index, so that formula 8 is used to construct the arc rate of change:
(iv t _t-1 (PI + Pt-1)/2-7. Effectively, a Cobb-Douglas framework is assumed. See Krishna, Martin, and Tan (1992) for details.
III. RESULTS
The results of applying the TRI concept to the MFA in the 1982-88 period are presented in tables 1 to 3. The results for the base case of a U.S. substitution elasticity equal to one are in table 1, and tables 2 and 3 replicate the calculations for elasticity values of 0.5 and 2.0, respectively. For the seven exporters, the tables present the rate of change of the TRI from the exporter's point of view (that is, equation 6 with shadow prices given by appendix equation A-15) and compare it with the change in the average tariff equivalent. The last two columns of the tables present the bilateral TRI from the U.S. point of view (that is, equation 6 with shadow prices given by appendix equation A-13). The second and fourth columns are in bold face to facilitate comparison between the changes in the exporter's compensated TRI and the tariff equivalent.
The results are quite striking in their implications for the use of the TRI. First, in the base case, the yearly changes in the tariff equivalent of the quota have the opposite sign from the rate of change of the TRI in 21 of the 3 8 observations. T he correlation coefficient between the two series is equal to 0.01, which is not significantly different from zero. Second, the results are not very sensitive to changes in the assumed elasticity of demand. Examining tables 1-3, sensitivity appears only in the results for Hong Kong from the Hong Kong point of view. This arises because Hong Kong has significant monopoly power in the low-elasticity case. Third, the results are not sensitive to variations in the method used to impute the license prices for exporters other than Hong Kong. A simple test of sensitivity to the method is performed by inferring relative unit costs from relative wages without adj asting for productivity. The imputed license prices rise by several hundred percent under this alternative method, but the TRI rates of change (not shown) are altered by less than 5 percent of the values in tables 1 to 3.
Fourth, application of the TRI concept to the Hong Kong point of view reveals very interesting properties of the TRI. In the base case, its movement over time reveals more restrictive policy in four of the six years. Hong Kong, as well as the United States, has been losing from this more restrictive policy direction. For a low value of the elasticity of U.S. import demand, however, the shadow prices of the quotas are almost all negative, whereas for the base case, about half the shadow prices are negative. A special issue of interpretation arises when -E B, q,, the deflator in A, is negative. This occurs in four of the six years for Hong Kong when the elasticity is at its lowest setting. The cases in which -E B, q, is negative in table 2 are indicated by an asterisk. If -E B, q, is positive, then a uniform proportional rise in q is welfare-improving. If it is negative, a fall in all quotas is welfare-improving. Thus, for the low value of the dlemand elasticity, Hong Kong benefits from the restrictiveness of the quota policy because of its monopoly power in trade. Hong Kong's market share ranged from 13 to 20 percent in the sample years.
These results may be compared with a finding of Trela and Whalley (1990) , who show that a reversion to free trade would hurt Hong Kong because of its Finally, a natural use of the TRI is to compare the evolution of trade policy across countries. The relative treatment of exporters in the MFA is a subject of considerable international political interest and pressure, peaking at negotiation times. The results show a large degree of nonuniformity across exporters in the evolution of MFA policy, broadly favoring the lower-cost exporters. Tables 1 to 3 show that MFA trade policy became more restrictive toward Korea and Thailand, as well as Hong Kong. In contrast, policy became less restrictive toward Indonesia, Mexico, and Bangladesh. Toward India, policy evolved more ambiguously but on balance became somewhat less restrictive. Significantly, this policy difference across exporters is not well described by the evolution of the average tariff equivalent index.
Each bilateral policy might naturally be evaluated from either the exporter's or the importer's point of view. The main emphasis here is on the exporter's point of view, but political pressure by exporters on importers might well be countered with use of a TRI based on the importer's point of view. Comparing the two TRIS, the adjustment of quota policy for growth makes a significant difference to the policy conclusion. With high-growth exporters and low-growth importers, the change in point of view is enough to make the evaluation of quota policy using the compensated TRI reverse sign in four cases of small monopoly power (two for Indonesia, one for Korea, and one for Thailand), besides two cases for Hong Kong that mix this effect with the effect of monopoly power. In such cases, a more appropriate index is the uncompensated TRI for the exporter or importer. The uncompensated TRIS differ in sign in only one observation in the base case, that of Hong Kong for 1988.
We conclude our discussion of results with some speculation as to why the results for the TRI and the average tariff equivalent results are uncorrelated. The trade-weighted average tariff equivalent has no theoretical foundation, of course, but its common use (along with the even more common use of average tariffs for non-quota-constrained goods) makes it a natural benchmark. The lack of correlation is perplexing in light of intuition based on only one quotaconstrained good. In this case the rate of change of the license price and minus the rate of change of the quota necessarily have the same sign. 8 Where does the difference in the two indexes come from? First, license prices change for many reasons other than shifts in the quota. This can explain an absence of strong negative correlation between changes in 8. The rate of change of the domestic price is equal to the elasticity of demand multiplied by minus the rate of change of the quota. The rate of change of the license price is equal to the rate of change of the domestic price times the ratio of the domestic price to the license price.
license prices and changes in quotas over time for each good. On the supply side of the market, export prices shift with costs as well as with the level of the importer's quotas. On the demand side of the market, domestic prices change over time because of changes in national income and in the prices of unconstrained goods, as well as changes in quotas. It should also be noted that the generalized law of demand, even for the CES case, does not guarantee perfect negative correlation of p and q, other things being equal.
Second, there is a difference in practice between the TRI weights and the trade weights used to form the indexes. For the importer this difference disappears in the CES case only under the (empirically false) restriction that the rent-retaining tariff is uniform over quota-constrained goods. 9 For the exporter, much more extreme false assumptions are required to reduce TRI weights to trade weights. 10 It is possible to construct an argument that the weights of the TRI and the tariff equivalent tend to be negatively correlated in the cross-section of quotaconstrained goods because of the dispersion of rent-retaining tariffs and of ad valorem license prices. 1 1
We conclude that theory gives no reason to expect that the average tariff equivalent will behave similarly to the TRI. Where it diverges, the TRI is a properly weighted index of changes in the actual policy, the vector of quotas, whereas the average tariff equivalent is an atheoretically weighted index of changes in the license prices (or price differentials), which themselves can be the result of changes in many factors other than policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has applied the TRI to one of the most important trade-distorted industries: textiles and apparel. Use of the TRI is strongly indicated because its implications are very often opposed to those based on standard atheoretic methods, and its implementation requires only the elements needed in any trade policy model of quotas.
The results show wide annual swings in the TRI as well as very significant differences in the movement of the index across countries. Toward Hong Kong, Korea, and Thailand, U.S. trade policy became more restrictive. Toward Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Mexico, policy became more liberal. Toward India, the policy evolution was more mixed but on balance liberal. 9 . Unde]r the assumptions, applying equation A-13 of the appendix, -B, is proportional to p,. The TRI weights of equation 6 contain -B, in both numerator and denominator, hence the factor of proportionallty cancels, and the TRI weights are equal to trade weights.
10. For an exporter with a tiny market share, the shadow price of a quota is approximately equal to its license price. If by chance the initial quota allocation (over the commodity categories, for all countries) is such that all the individual exporter's license prices are uniformly proportional to the domestc price (a uniform tariff equivalent), the factor of proportionality cancels out of the numerator and denominator of the weights, and the form of the TRI in rates of change is that of the analogue (for exporters) of equation 6.
11. The argument is rather technical, so we do not pursue it here.
Most significantly, the TRI and the average tariff equivalent are independent in the sense of descriptive statistics (the correlation coefficient for the two series is equal to 0.01), and their behavior is so significantly different as to lead to qualitatively different answers more than half the time (21 out of 38 observations for the base -case value of the U.S. demand elasticity). This replicates a finding of Anderson (1991) for imports of U.S. cheese, but for a much more important industry, Finally, the results show that the TRI measure is not very sensitive to the main sources of potential measurement error: the value of the license price and the value of the elasticity of demand. Inference about trade restrictiveness from tariff equivalents depends on obtaining reliable data on imputed quota license premiums where these are not directly observable. Krishna, Martin, and Tan (1992) show that imputation of MFA quota license prices from constructed costs, a method that has become standard, can be seriously misleading. In contrast, although the TRI requires license prices, it turns out to be quite insensitive to error in the imputation process in the application. The main problematic value is the appropriate adjustment for growth. Here, the analyst can at least provide a range ol reasonable values by using the compensated and uncompensated measures of the TRI. Therc are two important implications of this study for future work on quota policy evaluation in general and MFA policy evaluation in particular. First, inferences based on average tariff equivalents are very seriously misleading. Second, feasible alternatives exist, and they can be used to form aggregate indexes that can be used for many modeling purposes.
Despite these achievements, we do not claim that our methods have definitively pinned down the subject of our title. The excellent survey of Trela and Whalley (1990) emphasizes the many dimensions of textile and apparel markets that have so far eluded modelers. Phenomena such as shipment growth in excess of allowed quota growth rates, positive license prices with low utilization rates, and quality upgrading are important and are not explained by the model used here.
APPENDIX. THE SHADOW PRICES OF QUOTAS IN THE CES CASE
This appendix sets out an operational solution for the calculation of the MFA shadow prices of quotas. We assume a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) subexpenditure system for imports that is automatically separable into all MFA categories and all nonconstrained imports, thus permitting the simplicity of the separable structure of Anderson and Neary (1992b) . The first subsection derives the distorted expenditure system and then the inverse elasticity system for this CES case. The second subsection derives the shadow prices.
Inverse Demand Elasticity System in the CES Case
Let the subexpenditure function for U.S. imports be written (A-1) e (p, 7r, u) =(
where u is the level of utility, p is the domestic price of quota-constrained goods (MFA textiles and apparel), and ir is the domestic price of non-quota-constrained imports. The Armington assumption is imposed here so that there is no domestic production of a perfect substitute for imports. The elasticity of substitution is equal to the parameter a, and the as and Os are share parameters for the nonquota-constrained goods and the quota-constrained goods, respectively. For empirical work it is convenient to pick a base year for which prices are initially set to one. This implies that the as and ,Bs are the initial values of the expenditure share values in the base data and that the initial level of expenditure is equal to u. The true (that is, welfare-consistent) cost of living index is (A-2)
The quota-constrained imports are subject to fixed binding quotas equal to qk for all k. This results in a distorted expenditure function for the unconstrained goods. The distorted expenditure function is defined (as in Anderson and Neary 1992b ) by
The vector of maximizing prices that solves this program is a virtual price vector, each virtual price being the consumer's marginal willingness to pay for one more unit of the constrained good (Neary and Roberts 1980) . In the context of quotas, virtual prices are also market-clearing prices. Using Shephard's lemma, and solving the first-order (market-clearing) condition for the virtual and market price of each quota-constrained good k, we obtain (A-3 ) Pk ( q9 (Uk)l/ Substitutng equation A-2 into equation A-3, the vector of virtual prices p is implicitly defined as a function of the 7rs and the quotas. Fortunately, an explicit solution is available. First, substitute equation A-3 into equation A-2. Next, raise both right-and left-hand sides to the power 1 -a. Then, solve the resulting expression for pl -e. Finally, raise both sides to the power 1/(1 -(a). The reduced-form true cost of living price index is (A-4) -7r, q, u) q -(1-e)/e) Using ecluation A-4, this can be factored into (A-6) E(7r, q, u) = (a,jir-f) P(r, q, u)oU where P is given by equation A-4. The constrained demand for non-quotaconstrained imports is obtained from use of Shephard's lemma:
(A-7) El, = u.
The virtual price vector is obtained as where 5 k, is the Kronecker delta (Ok, = 0 for i k k, and bkk = 1), s, is the withingroup expenditure share of constrained good i, p,q,/p'q, and q is the constrained good's expenditure share of all expenditure.
In practice, it is important to differentiate between exporters for each good i. We assume that all exporters of good i produce a perfect substitute product. Then the inverse elasticity of domestic price k with respect to exports of good i from exporter h is written In what follows, we dispense with explicitly indexing the exporter and present expressions for a "typical" exporter.
The Shadow Price of Quotas
The shadow price of quota k in the case where export licenses are included in the tax base for ad valorem import tariffs is based on the arbitrage equation (A-11) Pk (Pk + Pk) (1 + Tk) where p * is the typical exporter's supply price for good k and Pk is the typical exporter's license price for good k. The shadow price of quotas for the United States is found by differentiating the U.S. balance-of-trade function with respect to the typical exporter's sales of good i: (A-12) - here v is equal to the trade-weighted average tariff on non-MFA-constrained imports. The vp, term is the cross-effect of quota change i on tariff revenue collected on non-MFA-constrained imports, using the results of Anderson and Neary (1992b) for the separable case. We simplify on the right-hand side of equation A-12 by substituting aggregate exports using the arbitrage equation A-11 where possible. First, differentiating equation A-11 and using the assumption of constant supply price, apk/aq, is equal to (apk/aq,) or 1± TIP, yyorkIk ~k) Anderson and Neary 189 The last bracketed term is close to zero because MFA expenditure is rather small as a share of the total budget (-q is small) and is being multiplied by another share, 0, which is also small-even Hong Kong has less than a quarter of the market. In practice, we ignore this term to ease the burden of calculation and data collection.
